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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK RIGGLE and GENEVA
H. RIGGLE, his wife,

Pla.intiffs and Respondents,
-vs.DAINES MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INC., a corporation,
Defendant arnd Appellarn.t.

Case No.
10948

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
The purpose of this case is to determine whether
or not tlw Defendant-Appellant is liable for the balance
due ou its promissory note in favor of the PlaintiffsRespondents.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
'l1he District Court by Decree dated March 28, 1967,
granted Summary Judgment for the amount due on
the promissory note in favor of the Plaintiffs-Respondrnts, including interest, attorney's fees and court costs.
1

On ..\larch 28, 1967, the Defendant-Appellant, ohjectc, 1]
to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg.
ment, and by Order dated J\Iay 3, 1967, the Court denied I
the Defendant-Appellant's objections.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment
of the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from Summary Judgment granted
in favor of the Plaintiffs-Respondents by the Salt Lake
County District Court upon finding no genuine issue ai
to any material facts.
The statement of facts offered by the Defendant.
Appellant, Daines Manufacturing Company, Inc., hereinafter ref erred to as "Corporation", is not entirely
supported by the record in this cause. The Plaintiffs·
Respondents are hereinafter referred to as "Riggle".
The following statements in Corporation's Brief
are inconsistent with the facts or not supported by the
record:
(a). On page 2 of Corporation's Brief, it
is stated: '' ... the makers of said promissory
note executed an employment contract with the
Plaintiff . . . '' The note referred to was the
$10,000.00 note, and no employment contract wi~b
the partnership has been offered or proposed in
evidence.
2

(b). On page 3 of Corporation's Brief, it is
claimed that the p0rso11s executing the $10,000.00
note were the incorporators of the Corporation.
No evidence has been proposed in relation to this
matter, and it is patently impossible, as at the
time of incorporation, January 18, 1955, (R-18)
the law required five incorporators (UCA 16-2-3).
A check of the Secretary of State's office of the
State of Utah indicates that the Corporation actually had ten (10) incorporators. Only four ( 4)
parties constituted said partnership.
( c). On page 8 of Corpora ti on 's Brief, in
arguing Point II, the Corporation refers to another case filed in the District Court by Riggle
against the partnership, and there is no reference
to this case or mention of it in the record.
( d). On page 9 of Corpora ti on 's Brief under
Point II, Corporation states: " ... The $9,612.58
'mentioned above' ·was payment made by the
Defendant to the Plaintiffs .... " This statement
is not supported by the evidence. The only payments made by the Corporation to Riggle in this
action are the salary payments and note payments indicated in Riggle 's affidavit (R-11), and
under the terms of Corporation's affidavit (R-20)
it is irnlicatecl that a major yiortion of snch
amount resulted from miscellaneous payments
made by partnership.
( e). On page 10 of Corporation's Brief, the
Corporation states: '' . . . the Defendant . . .
was substituted as the employer in the new contract ... '' There is no evidence to support this
statement.
In order to obtain a clear representation of the facts
and the chronology thereof, they are restated, eliminating those items not supported by the record.
3

On July 8, 1954, Riggle loaned a partnership
$10,000.00, which loan was represented by a promisson
note (R-36).
.
The Corporation was incorporated in the State of
Utah on January 18, 1955, (R-18, 46) six months and ten
days subsequent to the issuance of the note above ref erred to.
Five months and thirteen days after the birth of
Corporation, it entered into an employment agreement
with Riggle, such agreement requiring Riggle to act as
a business and engineering consultant for Corporation
and requiring Corporation to pay Riggle $150.00 per
month (R-13).
Corporation was seven months delinquent in its payments on the employment contract on August 1, 1957,
and Riggle agreed to terminate the employment contract
and Corporation's further liability for payments thereon
upon receipt of a promissory note covering past-due
payments (R-12, 47). On August 1, 1957, Corporatim1
delivered to Riggle its promissory note covering the
accrued but unpaid installments required by the employment contract (R-2, 11). Corporation made intermittent
payments on the note, reducing the balance to $344.94
ns of February 11, 1958 (R-2, R-11 par. 3, 4, 5 and 6).
The promissory note is admitted as genuine and the
signatures thereon are genuine (R-4, Admissions of
Plaintiff).
The Corporation, in its Statement of Facts, quote1
extensively from an Affidavit of Darrel R. Daines, a11
4

,,fficcr of Corporation. Most of the Affidavit contains
immaterial and inadmissible facts relating to events
occuning before the birth of Corporation.
It is important to note that there is no claim that

Riggle was an incorporator or stockholder of Corporation or that there were any other or additional contractual arrangements between Corporation and Riggle.
The record is silent on any fact that would establish
all obligation on the part of Corporation to enter into
thr employment contract with Riggle.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL TRANSACTION CANNOT
BFJ RENDERED USURIOUS BY A SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTION.
Corporation docs not claim that the promissory note
in this action is usurious, but only that the Corporation's
promissory note should be added to a prior partner~hip obligation, thereby making the prior obligation a
nsurious transaction (R-36). It is then claimed that
since the subsequent corporate transaction has been
added to the prior partnership transaction, a usurious
arrangement is created and the corporate transaction
is a product of the usurious partnership transaction.
If this theory of Corporation is sustained, it has created
il'g·a] perpetual motion, for unlike and unrelated transactions moving in concentric circles forever destroy one
i111otlter.
5

Corporation's only obligations to Riggle arose some
12 months after ::\Ir. Riggle had loaiwd $10,000.00 to a
partnership (R-2, 36) when it executed an employment
contract requiring Riggle 's services (R-11, 12, 13).
Corporation now alleges that its obligation to Riggle
was part of an earlier transaction between another party
and the obligation should have a retroactive effect I
thereby making the earlier transaction with the other
party usurious.
The employment contract and resultant promissory
note covering past due wages cannot be a part of a
transaction with another party accomplished before
Corporation was born.
Usury must exist in the original transaction. The
contract or promissory note must be usurious at the
time of its making. This rule has been adopted and
affirmed in Utah:

Page 427: '' ... The character of a contract with
respect to usury is determined as of the time it is
made. If it is then legal it cannot be rendered
usurious hy subsequent transactions ... which .. ·
cannot impart the taint of usury to an antecedent,
honest and legal agreement ... '' Cobb Y. Harte11stcin, 47 Utah 174, 152 P. 424 (1915).
This rule has been affirmed in Utah in Seaboard
Finance Company v. lVahlcn, et al., 123 Utah 529, 260
P.2d 556 (1953). (See also 102 ALR 573-577.)
The subject $1,050.00 note is a separate, distinct
contract. The note was not executed until over three
6

rears after the occurrence of the instance claimed by
Corporation to have been usurious, and has no causal
connection with the partnership transaction.
If, as claimed hy the Corporation, an employment
contract existed between the partnership and Riggle,
such employment contract could not have been binding
upon the Corporation for as indicated in the Utah case
of TV all v. Niagara Mining cf: Smelting Co. of Idaho, a
contract of a predecessor to a corporation is merely
an offer to the corporation which can either be accepted
or rejE•cted by the corporation.
Page 401 : '' . . . Where a contract is made by
and with promoters, which is intended to inure
to the benefit of a corporation about to be organized, such contract will be regarded as in the
nature of an open offer, which the corporation,
upon complete organization, may accept and
adopt or not, as it chooses . . . . The liability of
the corporation ... does not rest upon a supposed
agency of the promoters, and a ratification of
their acts, hut upon the immediate and voluntary
act of the company .... " Wall v. Niagara Mining
& Smelting Co. of Idaho, 20 Utah 474, 59 P. 399.
Since the Corporation was under no obligation to
employ Riggle then_, when it agreed to employ him some
51h months after its incorporation, it created a new
contract and obtained new benefits.
Corporation cites from 55 Am Jur, Usury, 390 Section 9G, wherein as a "black letter rule" it is in essence
stated that a subsequent transaction will not cure a
transaction which is usurious at the date of inception
7
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and the taint of usury attaches to the subsequent oblig~
tion "if the descent can be traced". (page 12, Corporation's Brief.) In this case please note that the descent
cannot be traced. The entire section of Am ,J ur deals
with renewals of original obligations.
Each of the three cases cited by the Corporation in
support of its position are factually distinguishable from
the case in hand.
In the cases of Richardson v. Foster, et al., 170 P.
321 (Washington), and Westman. v. Dye, 4 P.2d 134
(California), cited by Corporation, the actions were aetions on renewal transactions between identical partie~.
The continuity of the transactions was apparent.
In the Aspeitia v. California Trust Company case,
322 P.2d 265 (California), cited by Corporation, the action was by and for the benefit of the executor of the
maker of the note and the Court indicated that the executor stood in the shoes of the maker and therefore continuity or identity of parties was preserved.
The Corporation has cited no other cases or authorities, and as noted in each of the cases cited by Corporation, there is a continuity of parties and a direct
nbility to trace the descent of the transaction.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER,
FOR THERE ARE NO CONTESTED
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS.

8
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As indicated in the Corporation's Brief Summarv
'
,Judgment should not be granted if there is a genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the cases cited by the
Coq)oration to support this point reflect the applicable
law.
Corporation claims that it has raised issues m relation to usury and failure of consideration.
The determination as to whether or not there is
failure of consideration is a legal determination and
not a determination of a question of fact. The affirmative statement of a conclusion of law in the Complaint
of the Plaintiff docs not raise a factual question.
The promissory note executed by the Corporation
recites that it is issued "for value received" (R-2).
The promissory note is admitted to be genuine and
the signatures thereto genuine (R-4).
The promissory note was given to confirm an
amount owed to Riggle by the Corporation by reason
of an employment contract (R-11, Riggle's Affidavit,
and R-20, Affidavit of Darrel R. Daines, Corporation's
Agent), and therefore consideration for the note is
admitted.
The agreed consider a ti on for the promissory note
was the cancellation of the employment contract (R-12,
par. 8) ·which had a remaining term of 35 months, and
the promise to pay the amount of accrued, past due
salary payments (R-11, 20). It is apparent that there
are no questions of fact relating to consideration. The
9

Court determined as a matter of law that th(' consi(lrrntion was sufficient (R-47, par. 4, 5).
At the time Riggle loane(l the partnership $10,000.00,
the Corporation was not yet horn and eonseque11tly, the
Corporation could haw no ohligation to Riggle• (R-4i,
par. 15).
The record co11tai11s no faet that rais0 n question m1
the consi<leration for the Corporatio11 's promissory nok
The 011ly claim remaining is that the employment
contract, (the cancellatio11 of "·hich was a porti011 of tlw
consid('rntio11 for the promissory note), was a part of a
usurious transaction. It therdore hecomes necessan· to
tletermi11e \diat facts, if any, are claimed hy the Corporation as supporting the contention that the employment contract was part of a usurious transaction, and
if a k•gal c011clusion of usury can be drawn from these
facts.
The Corporation claims that oyer se,·e11 m011ths
prior to its organization, Riggle loaned a pad11Nship
$10,000.00, and the partnership agreed to pay such
amount arnl emplo)· Riggle.
Oral testimony
em. as to <>xistence of a fiw-war
.
plO)'ment contract would not he admissihle, as proof of
the same \vould lw prohihite(l by th(• Stcitntc of Fraud~
(UCA 23-5-4 ( 1)).
F,yide11tiary matter relating to tra11sactio11s occurri11g before thl· Corporatio11 cam0 into existence cnnlll
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not he admissible, for such facts would not be material
to the transactions of the Corporation.
Oral testimony as to the Corporation's agreement
to assume and answer for the debt of the partnership
would not be admissible under tlw Statute of Frauds
(UC.A 25-5-4 (2) ).
The employment contract executed by Corporation
was a separate agreement of the Corporation and no
material admissible evidence has been proposed by Corporation that could relate this transaction to a prior
partnership transaction and make it a part thereof.

In neither the pleadings nor Affidavit has Corporation offered to prove that Riggle owned or controlled
Corporation. Further, there is no offer to prove any
contractual relationship between Riggle and Corporation
pre-dating the employment contract. The Court found
no such relatio11ship (R-47, par. 14, 15; and R-48, par.
(), 8).
The claim is that the Corporation entered into a
contract of employment (R-19). The consideration for
such employment was the services to be performed by
Riggle as s<'t forth in the contract (R-13).
l\fr. Riggle paid to the partnership the $10,000.00
rn consiclera ti on of the partnership promissory note on
.f ulv
. 8, 19;)4' and the Corporation was organized six
months later (R-18, 46). Further, Riggle did not at
au~, time consent to the Corporation as an additional
or :;;nhstitute obligor on the $10,000.00 note owed by the

11

partnership, as indicated by the fact that in Case No.
155799 (referred to only in Corporation's Brief, page
10), Riggle sued the partnership and the partners and
not the Corporation, and the partners did not interplead
the Corpora ti on.

It is axiomatic that the Corporation cannot be bonnd
by the acts of its predecessors or creators. This rule has
been adopted and affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court:
Page 400: '' . . . that which has no existence can
have no agent, and, in the absence of any act
authorizing them so to do, can enter into no contract, nor transact any business, which shall bind
the proposed corporation after it becomes a distinct entity. . . . " Wall v. Niaga.ra Mining &
Smelting Co. of Idaho, 20 Utah 474, 59 P. 399.
and in the case of Murry v. Monter:
Page 962 : '' . . . The general rule of law is that
promoters who undertake to organize a corporation cannot bind the corporation by their contracts and agreements made before the corporation was organized. . . . " Murry v. Monter,
90 Utah 105, 60 P.2d 960.
(Also refer to 18 Am Jur 2cl, Corporations, Section 18:
18 CJS, Corporations, Section 122; 149 ALR 787 and
797; 123 ALR 727.)
The rule is both logical and necessary, for otherwise
there is no way that the stockholders of the Corporation
could he protected as indicated h.v this Honorable Court:
Page 589: '' ... The only protection of the stockholders, and of subsequent corporate creditors,
12

against such a result lies in the rule that the
corporation is not bound by the contracts of its
promoters. The rule is just and should not be
weakened .... " Tanrner v. Sinaloa Land & Fruit
Co., 43 Utah 14, 134 P. 586.
A contract with the predecessor of the Corporation
is only an offer to the Corporation and if the Corporation chooses to accept such contract (off er), then a new
contract arises as is stated in the Wall v. Niaga;ra case
(supra).
It ill behooves Corporation after it has negotiated
the cancellation of $6,300.00 of indebtedness (the remaining unpaid amount of the employment contract) for only
$1,050.00 and ratified the entire transaction by making
payments thereon to reduce the balance to $344.94 to
now claim that the entire transaction was an error.
The Corporation could have refused to enter into
the employment contract, and Riggle would have had
110 recourse.
The Corporation need not have entered into the
employment contract binding itself for four years, but
of course, if it did not, it could not have required the
services of Mr. Riggle during such period. After entering into the employment contract and defaulting in the
performance thereof the Corporation need not have
accepted the $5,250.00 net benefit resulting from the
r·ancellation of the contract. In each instance, the Corporation acted without compulsion and to its own benefit.

13

It is apparent that most of the evidence claimed hy
Corporation wouhl uot he admissihle>, hut p\·en if a<imitted could not affect the legal conclusions in this case.
Corporation should not be allowed to avoid or delay
the predictable consequC'nces of its premeditatC'd acts
hy alleging inadmissible' and unrelated matters and requesting a trial thereof.
The Judgment shoul(l lw affirmed and the' Corporation required to pay its contract.
POINT III
THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
BY THE COURT WAS PROPER.
Corporation admitted that the promissory note provides for a ttorne~- 's fees ( R-9, 35).
The Court found the attorney's fees were rrasonable (R-47, par. 12).
The rnle controlling the reasonableness of attorney's fees is stated in F.M.A. Financial Corporation "·
Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2cl 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965):
Page 673: '' ... Because both judges and lawyers
hm·e special knowledge as to the value of legal
services, this is not always required to be pr?Y~d
ln- sworn testimony .... the judge may fix it tll
tlie has is of his o~Yn knowledge and experience;
and/or in connection with reference to a Bar
approved schedule . . . . these would have provi<lr<l an e,·identiary hasis for making the determi nation .... ''
14
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'rhe above case had a very similar fact situation to
the subject case. The plaintiff was granted summary
judgment on a promissory note and was awarded attorney's fees in accordance with a Bar schedule. No evidence of attorney's fees was introduced, hut the Court
did make a finding of fact of the reasonableness and
granted judgment for fees. The defendant denied the
reasonableness of attorney's fees, which this Court
stated created an issue of fact.
The case was remanded only for the purpose of
taking evidence on attorney's fees. Corporation has not
denied reasonableness of claimed attorney's fees. It has
admitted the note provides for attorney's fees, but
denied that there should be an award of attorney's fees
hecausc it claims it has no liability on the promissory
note ( R-35).
Corporation has not made proffers of proof in
respect to attorney's fees or denied the reasonableness
of attorney's fees. The Corporation therefore has admitted the reasonableness of attorney's fees if it is
found to he liable on the promissory note.
CONCLUSION
A simple case has been presented. A Corporation
executed a promissory note (admitted genuine) to confirm a debt due and to obntin a contractual advantage.
The Corporation did not pay the entire amount of the
note and when sued, in search of a defense claimed that
another entity had a usurious relationship with Riggle

15

before its existence and therefore that the Corporation
is not liable. The defense is not proper. There is no
continuity of parties. There is no possible way to con- ,
nect the transactions. There is no unity of time, place,
purpose or parties. The defense has no continuity, and
any evidence tending to establish continuity would not
be admissible.
Would the Court, in violation of common sense, the
rules of evidence and the Statute of Frauds, allow Corporation to adduce oral proof of events transpiring prior
to its existence in order to avoid its just debts as reflected b~v written contracts? After three noYations,
should the Court allow the Corporation to go back into
ancient history in order to claim an "original sin" and
taint all the descendants with such sin? The obvious
answer is no.
There is no genuine issue of material fact nor legal
theory that ''rnuld justify trial of this cause.
It is respectfully submitted that in order to effect
the purposes of the Rules of Ci,·il Procedure, thereby
providing for efficient and prompt administration of
justice, this Court should sustain the .Judgment of the
District Court.
Respectfull~·
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